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Abstract 
Economists have a well-developed theory of value but the theory of why people hold the 
values they do is rudimentary at best. In spite of the fact that it is common to argue that 
values are important, most work on values is normative and the positive theory of values is 
relatively under- developed. In this paper we propose a simple yet general way to think about 
values – they are about how one trades-off one own’s utility against that of others – and argue 
that we can draw on the large literature on pro-social behavior for hypotheses on how people 
will choose values.  Then, using data from the UK’s Citizenship Survey we show how 
models of self-interest, fairness, reciprocity and identity, can explain many of the patterns 
that we observe in the data across a wide variety of values.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Economists have a well-developed theory of value but the theory of why people hold the values 
they do is rudimentary at best.  Yet, values are widely thought to be important not just for the 
welfare of the people who hold them but for the welfare of others with whom they come in 
contact1.  Furthermore, there is evidence that values are changing in many contemporary 
societies (see, for example, Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).  There is widespread, though not 
universal, concern that these changes are not for the better and that some action needs to be 
taken, though there is much less agreement about what this should be.  To adequately deal with 
these questions we need a clear idea of what are values, why they are important and how people 
come to hold the values that they do.  But much of the existing literature on the subject is vague 
on some or all of these points.  In this paper we try to be clearer. 
 In this paper we view values as norms about how one should behave in a situation where 
there is a trade-off between one’s own welfare and that of others.  To give a specific example, 
consider a value which we analyze later in the paper “people should be free to say what they 
believe even if it offends others”.  If I want to say something some other will find offensive then 
presumably I would feel better expressing that view – ‘better out than in’ as it were.  But if 
others find it offensive then presumably that is because they would be better off not hearing that 
view expressed.  Whether or not I exhibit restraint affects the distribution of utility between me 
and the other.  Most – though not all2 - of what we think of as ‘values’ have this characteristic. 
                                                 
1
 For example, a popular textbook in political philosophy (Kymlicka, 2002, p285) writes that “the health and 
stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its basic institutions, but also on the quality and 
attitudes of its citizens; e.g. their sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of national, 
regional, ethnic, or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from 
themselves; their desire to participate in the political process..; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise 
personal responsibility in their economic demands”. 
2
 There are exceptions – some value systems label some behaviours as ‘wrong’ even when they seem only to affect 
the individuals concerned – homosexual acts between consenting adults would be one example.   
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 From this definition of ‘values’ it is simple to understand why they matter.  If my actions 
affect the welfare of others, then there is an externality.  The prevailing ‘values’ are likely to 
affect both the level and distribution of welfare in the economy.  The natural inclination of 
economists might be to try to think of a ‘price’ mechanism to remedy the externality so that, for 
example, if I really want to say something you will find offensive, then, depending on property 
rights, I give you money to allow me to get it off my chest or you give me money to keep it 
inside.  But, one can readily understand that there are many areas of human interaction where 
such a price mechanism cannot be thought to work and it is in precisely those areas where 
‘values’ are used to regulate behaviour.  These areas of human interaction are very important to 
people’s sense of well-being.  One could go further and argue that ‘values’ may have 
consequences for purely economic outcomes.  If I think you may say something that offends me 
I may be reluctant to enter into an economic relationship with you.  The area most familiar to 
economists that uses this type of argument is about trust and trustworthiness – if the value is that 
you should be trustworthy i.e. not take every opportunity to benefit yourself at the expense of 
others, then others may be more likely to enter into an economic relationship with you (see, to 
give just a few references to an enormous literature, Coleman, 1990, Putnam, 1993, and 
Fukuyama, 1995). 
 The definition of ‘values’ that we propose also helps us to think about ‘theories of 
values’, why people hold the ‘values’ that they do.  If people are irredeemably selfish then values 
could never get off the ground.  But evidence from other areas e.g. attitudes to redistribution 
either in real economies or in experiments gives us guidance for how people seem to behave 
when faced with trade-offs between their own utility and that of others.   
In the next section of the paper review the evidence on the extent and limits of pro-
sociality.  We then consider an application of the ideas to contemporary Britain, a society that 
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has become concerned in recent years that it has failed to foster appropriate values among some 
of its population3.  Using data from the 2007 Citizenship Survey, we investigate how values are 
correlated with ethnicity, religion, identity, segregation and diversity, discrimination and 
economic success.  We offer explanations, hedged with appropriate caution, for the correlations 
we observe. 
Our main conclusions are the following.  First, self-interest does seem to play a role in 
explaining values – generally a particular value benefits some more than others and the likely 
beneficiaries are more likely to be in favour of it.  But, self-interest is not everything.  In 
particular, we do seem to find support for ideas of ‘reciprocity’ – people who feel well-treated 
are more likely to be in favour of values that benefit others.  Thirdly, identity is important – 
people are more likely to be in favour of values that benefit people who are in their ‘group’ 
whether that is defined by ethnicity, religion, nationality or locality. 
We conclude this introduction with a health warning.  We are acutely aware of the 
limitations of the present study and we outline them here.  First, we do not have a clean research 
design – our empirical evidence is simply correlations so the best we can do is to claim that we 
are exploring associations in the data.  Secondly, there are multiple potential explanations for 
many of these associations, which we do our best to outline though we would not make claims to 
completeness.  Thirdly, the theoretical ideas that we use as the basis for our explanations are 
themselves hotly debated, debates we do not resolve here.  Although we are aware of these 
problems, we do think our analysis has some value as the topic is so important yet so poorly 
understood.  It is an early attempt to think about these questions, not the final one.     
 
                                                 
3
 For example, in the British context, Gordon Brown gave a speech in 2006 on ‘The Future of Britishness’ - 
http://www.fabians.org.uk/events/speeches/the-future-of-britishness  
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1. Existing Literature 
 In this section we discuss the existing strands of literature on how people have the values 
that they do.  The part of the social sciences that most directly discusses ‘values’ is probably 
political philosophy (see Kymlicka, 2002, for an accessible overview).  Much – probably most – 
of this literature is essentially normative i.e. is concerned with a question like ‘what values 
should citizens hold for society to be just?’.  A good example of influential work of this type 
would be Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ (Rawls, 1999) who argued that the state (and citizens) 
should be neutral towards different conceptions of the ‘good life’ as long as those conceptions 
respected some basic principles of justice.  A problem with these normative views is that they do 
not provide a compelling account of why and how citizens will hold these desirable values i.e. 
they lack a positive theory.  For example Rawls (1999, p10) argued that his principles of justice 
were “the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would 
accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association”, 
using his concept of the veil of ignorance to support this view.  But, it is not clear why 
individuals who are not in a veil of ignorance should choose their values as if they were (that, in 
itself, is a principle which people might not hold), so such arguments are not entirely persuasive4.  
This problem has been recognized in more recent political philosophy – for example some of 
Rawls’ later work (Rawls, 1993) is much more concerned with the feasibility and stability of his 
conception of the ‘just society’, for example introducing the idea of ‘overlapping consensus’ that 
intolerant minorities might nonetheless support a policy of tolerance because they would 
otherwise be on the receiving end of discrimination.  Nevertheless, it still strikes an outsider that 
                                                 
4
 Konow (2003) provides a survey of which theories of justice seem to be regarded as valid by people, something 
that would seem to be necessary for a normative theory to become reality. 
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the ‘positive theory of values’ is rather undeveloped within political philosophy5.  In addition 
there does not seem to be much in the way of evidence on the factors making people choose the 
values they have.  For example, Kymlicka (2002, p368) concludes a chapter of multiculturalism 
by saying “it is not clear that philosophical speculation can contribute much here: we need to 
wait for more and better evidence”.  It is to these areas that we hope to contribute in this paper. 
 There has been a resurgence in recent years among economists in understanding the 
‘values’ that people have, based on the recognition that values are important for economic 
outcomes, work that might be subsumed under the broad heading of ‘cultural economics’ (see, 
for example, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006, or Fernandez, 2008).  Trust and 
trustworthiness have received the most attention though it is not clear whether that is because 
this is the most important value or because it is the one for which we have the most data.  
Interesting parts of this work have shown how values are commonly inherited from parents e.g. 
Algan and Cahuc (2009) show how the levels of trust among the children of immigrants in the 
United States is correlated with the general levels of trust in the countries from which their 
parents came and Fernandez and Fogli (2009) show how the work and fertility patterns of 
second-generation American women are influenced by the culture of the countries from which 
their parents came.  Theoretical work as in Bisin and Verdier (2000), Bisin, Topa and Verdier 
(2004) and Corneo and Jeanne (2009) build models in which the attitudes of children are partly 
influenced by the values and socialization efforts of their parents and partly by the values 
prevalent in the wider community.  This work is important and undoubtedly contains an 
important truth.  But it does not really help us to understand where values come from in the first 
                                                 
5
 Others within the economics tradition have also made this or a similar observation.  For example, Binmore (1994, 
p42) writes “a fair social contract will therefore be an equibrium in the game of morals, but what must never be 
forgotten is that it must also be an equilibrium in the game of life – otherwise it will not be viable”.  However, most 
of these contributions are theoretical, whereas ours is empirical. 
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place6.  For example, it is clear that attitudes towards women and homosexuality have changed 
dramatically in the past 50 years in western liberal democracies – but we do not have a way of 
understanding why these innovations in values first originated and why they gained significant 
levels of acceptance7. 
 In this paper we do not present a new ‘theory of values’ – rather our approach is to use 
our insight that values are norms about how one should behave in a situation where there is a 
trade-off between one’s own welfare and that of others, and to then draw on existing theories and 
evidence about such ‘other-regarding’ behaviour.  The literature on ‘other-regarding’ behaviour 
is enormous, growing rapidly and has the feature that there is no consensus.  Here we describe, in 
broad terms, the factors that researchers working in this area, have argued to be important. 
 The first is that ‘selfishness’ does play some role in explaining behaviour.  In the current 
context, this means that we might expect people to support values that advantage them at the 
expense of others.  This might seem an odd approach to take when we have argued that values 
are often about not putting yourself first, but, because they are phrased in anonymous terms, and 
will act as a constraint on the behaviour of others as well as oneself, it is possible to be a net 
beneficiary.  For example, if discrimination by whites against blacks is more common than 
discrimination by blacks against whites, we might expect blacks to be more in favour than whites 
of the value ‘do not discriminate on the basis of race’, even though that value is race-neutral. 
 But, if everyone was irredeemably selfish, then most values would have no chance to get 
off the ground as, while everyone would love to impose values on others to the advantage of 
themselves, they would have no chance of success and would not follow the values that others 
                                                 
6
 One exception is provided by the fascinating paper of Jha (2008) who argues that religious toleration in India is 
more common in towns that were medieval ports as there were larger gains from trade between Muslims and Hindus 
in such places and this led to the creations of institutions which had staying-power long after the original raison 
d’etre had disappeared.  This combines a persistence mechanism together with an account of where values came 
from in the first place. 
7
 Though see Inglehart and Welzel (2005) for attempts to explain the general shift in values. 
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seek to impose on them.  Values as we know and understand them would probably not exist if 
everyone was always selfish.  Fortunately for the present enquiry, we do have lots of evidence 
that the selfishness axiom is violated in many situations8.  But there is much less agreement 
about when and why people behave in pro-social ways.  Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provide a 
useful survey which we use to structure our discussion. 
 First, people may be altruistic, simply caring about the well-being of others. But, they 
may also be envious, being made worse-off by the well-being of others.  The way in which the 
well-being of others affects one’s own utility may vary with the person and the circumstances.  
One may be more altruistic towards the poor than the rich if one cares about the distribution of 
rewards or ‘fairness’ (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, Charness and Rabin, 
2002).  Or, one’s attitude to the other may be affected by their intentions towards you or how 
they have treated you.  One special form that has received particular attention is reciprocity – 
that whether one is altruistic towards or envious of others depends on how they have behaved 
towards you - kindness is repaid with kindness and nastiness with nastiness (see, for example, 
Rabin, 1993)9.  There is also accumulating evidence that the ‘social situation’ affects the extent 
and nature of other-regarding behaviour – see, for example, Levitt and List, 2007; List, 2009).   
One other factor that emerges as importance in much research is that identity matters - 
‘other-regarding’ behaviour is more marked towards members of a group with which one 
                                                 
8
 One might argue that the selfishness axiom is violated because of the acceptance of ‘values’ that deem total 
selfishness inappropriate.  But, these values can only exist because people can be persuaded to follow them, so that 
injunctions against selfishness do not fall on barren ground.  For example, Kaplow and Shavell (2007) derive an 
optimal moral system in which induced feelings of guilt and virtue are used to motivate pro-social acts.  But this 
system can only function if individuals care about guilt and virtue.  Hauser (2006) argues that a ‘moral capacity’ is 
innate to the way our minds are constructed.   
9
 There is one final point to make that emerges from models of reciprocity.  Even if an individual is totally selfish, 
they may support values that harm their own welfare relative to others if a failure to support would result in being 
punished by those who would benefit from the value.  In a dictator game, a selfish first-mover is induced by the 
threat of a vindictive responder to offer the responder a non-zero share of the cake even if they do not care about the 
utility of the responder. 
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identifies (see, for example, the discussion in Putnam, 2007).  One might be indifferent or 
envious towards members of ‘out-groups’.  In this case, one would support values that are of 
benefit to those with whom one identifies, which might be defined along the lines of ethnicity, 
religion, nationality or neighbourhood.   
 We have done nothing more here than give a very brief overview of the main ways in 
which economists have tried to understand deviations from selfishness.  What is new in our 
approach is to apply these insights to an understanding of why people support or oppose certain 
values.  Our specific application is to the values held by people in contemporary Britain.  This 
application is of interest not just because it is one possible source of information on the relevance 
of the ideas expressed in this section, but because there is a very active debate about whether or 
not the values held are desirable.  Even if one concluded that they are not, one would not be able 
to decide how to improve things without some model of why people hold the values they do.  
The next section provides a more extensive discussion of the context. 
 
2. Data 
In contemporary Britain, there is serious concern about the ‘erosion of values’10.  At the 
risk of caricature, it is a common view that the indigenous white population is being consumed 
by selfishness and materialism, and that immigration has imported into the UK cultures with 
very different values and that the official approach of tolerance and respect for all cultures has 
led to insufficient effort being put into changing those values with the result that the children of 
some immigrant groups are growing up very isolated from society.  Events like the London 
bombings of 2005 have shocked people into thinking something has gone badly wrong.  For 
                                                 
10
 See, to give just a few examples, the articles by Henry Porter in the Observer in July 2006, by Billy Bragg in the 
Guardian in April 2007 and  Michael Nazir-Ali, Bishop of Rochester in the Daily Telegraph of 29 May 2008 . 
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example, the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (the government body charged 
with fighting discrimination) argued in a TV interview that multiculturalism was leading to 
segregation, saying that “too many public authorities particularly [are] taking diversity to a point 
where they [are] saying, 'actually we're going to reward you for being different, we're going to 
give you a community centre only if you are Pakistani or African Caribbean and so on, but we're 
not going to encourage you to be part of the community of our town'”. The reaction has included 
not just a wringing of hands but also substantive changes to policy – immigrants becoming 
citizens now have to pass a test on language, culture and history designed to mould their values 
into those deemed appropriate11.  But, there is little in the way of quantitative evidence about the 
values actually held and that is what we try to provide. 
Our strategy in very general terms is to regress values on a set of regressors chosen to be 
factors that we might expect to be associated with values on the basis of the theoretical 
considerations outlined in the previous section or the observations of commentators inside or 
outside academia - in spirit, our paper is similar to Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) who 
investigate the correlates with trust.   The data we use in this paper is taken from England and 
Wales’ 2007 Citizenship Survey (CS) administered by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government12.  This survey has been conducted (though under varying names) every two 
years since 2001.  The sample is approximately 10,000 adults in England and Wales with an 
additional boost sample of 5,000 adults from minority ethnic groups which allows a large enough 
sample from those groups for statistical analysis.  The survey asks questions about a wide range 
of issues, including race equality, faith, feelings about their community, identity, and various 
                                                 
11
 See http://ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/ukresidency/settlement/languageandlifeinuk/ for details of this. 
12
 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/racecohesionfaith/research/citizenshipsurvey/ for more details. 
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measure of social capital.  This survey owes its existence to the concerns outlined in the previous 
paragraph. 
Sub-Samples 
We mostly conduct our analysis separately for 3 sub-samples largely because the factors 
associated with supporting different values seem very different for them.  The first sub-sample is 
the UK-born who describe their ethnicity as ‘white British’.  This is obviously the largest group 
in the population as a whole but, because the CS over-samples ethnic minorities they are under-
represented in our analysis sample.  Our second sample is non-white first-generation immigrants 
i.e. those born abroad.  These are of interest because they may have come from cultures different 
from that of the white British norms and their integration into British society is seen as an 
important matter of public concern.  Our third sample is the non-white British born – for the 
most part these will be the children of the second sub-sample.  They are of particular interest 
because of fears that they adhere more closely to the culture of the countries from which their 
parents originated than to British values (see, for example, Algan and Cahuc, 2009, Fernandez 
and Fogli, 2009, for evidence pertinent to this).  For the non-white ethnic groups we reduce the 
13 categories in the original survey to 8 – Mixed, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black 
Caribbean, Black African, Chinese and Other.  This is because sample sizes are very small for 
some of the other groups. 
This way of dividing the sample does exclude white immigrants and the white UK-born 
who do not describe their ethnicity as ‘white British’.   We exclude them because they are a 
small part of the sample (under 5% - as there is no explicit boost sample for them) and because 
they are a very heterogeneous group comprising, for example, those of Irish origin (who we 
know from other work are very reluctant to adopt a British identity – see Manning and Roy, 
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2006), recent Eastern European immigrants and some Middle Eastern immigrants.  Any 
inference about the outcomes for these groups are unreliable so we think it best to say nothing 
about them.  Table 1 presents the proportions of the three sub-samples in our data and the 
weighted proportions (the weights being intended to reproduce the UK population as a whole). 
 Table 1 also presents some basic demographics.  The white natives are older, on average 
than the immigrants who in turn are older than the UK-born minorities.  The gender mix is 
similar.  In terms of education both of the non-white sub-samples are more likely to have a 
degree but the immigrants are also more likely to have only foreign or no qualifications (see 
table A.1 in appendix A for a detailed coding of education).  The ethnic mix of the foreign- and 
UK-born minorities is also different – the UK-born have more Black Caribbeans and more mixed 
race (who are mostly a Black-white mix).  Recent immigrant groups like the Bangladeshis and 
Black Africans are under-represented in the UK born.  In terms of religion 80% of the white 
natives report being Christian with 17% reporting no religion and very small numbers other 
religions.  The minority sub-samples are more likely to have some religion but are also different 
in their type of religion – there being as many Muslims as Christians.   
 
Independent Variables 
On the right-hand side of the equations we estimate, we include the usual demographics (gender, 
age, education, and region) but we are particularly interested in variables which reflect factors 
that have been argued to be important in contemporary Britain, and which can be interpreted 
using the theoretical framework we sketched in the previous section. The factors we consider 
are: 
- ethnicity 
- religion 
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- identity 
- English language proficiency 
- Mixing 
- Discrimination 
- economic situation   
- pro-sociality 
Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Table 2.  We now briefly summarize 
these variables and explain why they might be important in influencing values.   
 
Ethnicity 
There are several possible reasons why might ethnicity be associated with values?  First, to the 
extent that some values disproportionately affect minorities, we might expect self-interest to play 
a role.  Secondly, ethnicity may be associated with identity so affects the individual’s in-group.  
Thirdly, we know from other research (e.g. Fernandez and Fogli, 2009 on female employment 
and Algan and Cahuc, 2009, on trust) that the behavior of immigrants and their children shows 
the traces of the customs and practices characteristic of the countries from which they came – if 
value systems have persistence we might expect to find evidence for this.    
All of these are reasons why we include self-described ethnicity in our regressions.  But, 
just because one is of a certain ethnicity, does not mean that forms a central part of one’s 
identity.  So, we also include variables which can be thought of measuring the intensity of ethnic 
identification as the more important is one’s ethnicity to one’s sense of identity the more likely 
one is to have values characteristic of that identity.  The CS contains two such measures – there 
is a question which asks ‘how important is your ethnic background to your sense of who you 
are” (IMPETH) and a variable (IMPFO) which asks a similar question about the country from 
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which the family came originally13.  Table 3 shows the average values of these variables for our 
3 sub-samples – both of the non-white sub-samples attach more importance to ethnicity with 
higher levels of importance for the UK-born non-whites than the immigrants.  However, white 
natives do show quite high levels of both of these variables. 
 
Religion 
Religion might be expected to affect values for much the same reasons as ethnicity.  We might 
expect to find a stronger relationship between values and religion than between values and 
ethnicity because most if not all religions seek to instill certain values – and some have argued 
those value systems to be very different (e.g. Huntington, 2002).  We include controls for 
religion – the categories being Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Other and None.  We also have 
some controls that measure the intensity of religious identity – whether the religion is being 
actively practiced, the importance of religion to one’s sense of identity, and the importance of 
religion for where you live, where you work, who your friends are and what school you send 
your children to.  We combine all of these measures into a single scale – IMPORTREL – which 
measures the importance of religion to the individual14.  Table 2 shows that religion is least 
important to the white natives and most important for the non-white immigrants.  There are 
significant differences in the importance of religion across religions – it is most important to 
Muslims (in line with the findings of Bisin et al, 2006) but there is not a clean division between 
them and others – Sikhs and Hindus lie between the Muslims and Christians in the importance of 
religion. 
 
                                                 
13
 See Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann (2008) for other ways of doing this. 
14
 Details of the construct of this and other composite measures can be found in Appendix A. 
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Identity 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argued that individuals have a demand for identity and that 
membership of a particular group often requires certain norms of behaviour (that may be anti-
social, especially towards ‘out-groups’).   Many of these norms are essentially values about how 
to behave in interactions with people who are both in and out of the group.  Generally the pro-
social norms are stronger for the in-group so that we would expect identity to affect values to the 
extent that those values favour the in-group.   
 We have already discussed the measures of ethnic and religious identity but the CS also 
has other measures.  We include as a variable NATIONID, a variable based on the response to 
the question ‘how strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?’ – responses are coded on a 4-
point scale with 0 being ‘not at all strongly’ and 1 ‘very strongly’.  Table 3 shows similar mean 
responses for all sub-samples.  We also use a similar question on how strongly the respondent 
feels they belong to the local neighbourhood – we call this variable, NEIGHID.  Table 3 again 
shows similar mean levels of this variable for our three sub-samples. 
 These two questions are about the individual’s sense of belonging.  But, it is quite likely 
not to be just one’s own identity but how it is perceived by others that is important.  For 
example, if whites do not see non-whites as British - so categorizing non-whites as part of an 
‘out-group’ – we would expect this to have an effect on the values propounded by whites even if 
all the non-whites actually saw themselves as British.  Hence, we use a question DUALID on 
whether the respondent thinks it is possible to belong to Britain and maintain a separate religious 
and cultural identity – this is a 4-point scale with 0 being ‘strongly disagree’ and 1 ‘strongly 
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agree’.  Table 3 shows that non-whites are much more likely than whites to think that belonging 
to Britain is compatible with having a separate religious and cultural identity15. 
 
Language Proficiency 
It is commonly argued that language proficiency is critical in enabling people to be full citizens 
and enabling people to understand what are appropriate values.  Policy changes in the UK in 
recent years have been directed towards ensuring that immigrants are sufficiently proficient to be 
able to hold down a job and mix with those outside their culture.  The CS contains a number of 
variables relating to proficiency in English.  We combine four such measures into a single 
composite measure ELANG16.  As one would expect English proficiency is highest for white 
natives, followed by non-white natives and non-white immigrants.  It is worth noting that very 
few non-white natives report any problem with English so, as one might expect, all language 
problems affect only the first generation of immigrants.  In this context it is worth noting that 
there has been little or no dissent in the UK from the view that all education should be in English 
so bilingualism is not really an issue as it is in some other countries (see, for example, Aspachs-
Bracons et al 2008a,b, or Angrist et al, 2008) 
 
Segregation and Diversity 
There has been considerable speculation about the effects of diversity and segregation on 
relationships between communities.  The ‘contact’ hypothesis suggests that mixing makes one 
care more about the ‘other’ so might be expected to be associated with values that are more 
                                                 
15
 We imagine that the whites do not see their own religious and cultural identity as incompatible with belonging to 
Britain – rather they see belonging to Britain as implying a particular set of cultural and religious practices that are, 
more or less, their own. 
16
 Unfortunately the routing of the questions does not ask about proficiency for those who speak English at home 
(and we assume they are proficient) even though there are, for example, well-known literacy problems among 
segments of the white native population. 
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beneficial to the ‘other’.  On the other hand, the ‘conflict’ hypothesis suggests that proximity 
increases conflict over resources, leading to greater in-group solidarity and more out-group 
hostility.  More recently, influential work by Putnam (2007) argued that there are lower levels of 
trust among all ethnic groups in diverse communities so that diversity is associated with social 
isolation.   
The CS contains a number of variables related to diversity, segregation and mixing.  
First, there is a measure of the proportion of non-whites in the ward in which the respondent 
lives (PETHWARD) – this is only recorded as deciles across wards.  This is hard data from the 
2000 Census.  As can be seen from Table 2, the non-white sub-samples are more likely to live in 
wards with many non-whites. The UK-born minorities are only marginally less segregated 
residentially than the immigrants.  
 Secondly there is a variable about perceptions of the ethnic mix in the local area 
(ETHAREA).  This is a 4-point scale taking the value 0 if everyone is the same ethnicity as the 
respondent and 1 if less than half are the same ethnicity. Whites are more likely to live in an area 
with lots of the same ethnicity as one would expect.  
 These variables might be expected to reflect the opportunities for mixing but there are 
also some more direct questions about mixing.  The variable MIXING is a single scale extracted 
from ten variables about the extent of mixing in different environments – details in the 
Appendix.  Table 2 shows that white natives are least likely to have friends of a different 
ethnicity (perhaps not surprising given the proportions in the population) but that there is more 
mixing for non-white natives than non-white immigrants.  In interpreting results of this variable 
it is important whether one thinks of mixing as unavoidable or a choice.  The mixing questions 
ask about some domains (e.g. shops) where mixing is probably unavoidable if you live in an 
ethnically diverse community, but other domains (e.g. the home) where one has total control.  
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Mixing across different domains is strongly correlated so we prefer to think as this being a 
variable affected primarily by the nature of the local community rather than a choice variable of 
the individual.   
  
Discrimination 
As discussed in the previous section, we might expect that notions of fairness and reciprocity 
mean that the extent of pro-sociality in one own’s value systems is influenced by how one feels 
one is treated by others.  To try to capture this idea we include variables related to perceptions 
and experience of discrimination.  We include three composite variables.  The first, 
GOVDISCRIM, is a composite variable derived from the responses to questions on whether the 
respondent thinks one is treated worse, better or the same as people of other races by 15 public-
sector organization from doctors, local councils through to the criminal justice system.  Table 2 
shows that non-whites are more likely than whites to think they will be treated worse but it is 
non-white natives who perceive this most.  But, it is also worth noting that white natives also 
show a level of perceived discrimination not massively lower than non-white immigrants17. 
The variable discussed above is about discrimination experienced or perceived by public-
sector bodies.  But it is also quite likely that how one is treated by other people in everyday 
interactions is important in influencing values.  To capture this we use a variable, RESPECT, 
which is a composite variable constructed from responses to questions about whether one feels 
treated with respect in 4 settings.  Table 2 shows generally high levels of respect but slightly 
higher among immigrants than both native sub-samples. 
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 It is perhaps worth noting that there are differences across ethnic groups in the organizations perceived to treat 
them worse – blacks are especially likely to single out the police and criminal justice system, whites the housing 
authorities and local councils.  Asians report discrimination fairly evenly spread across organizations. 
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 The two variables related to discrimination discussed so far have both been about how 
any discrimination affects one’s personal experiences.  But it may also be the case that 
perceptions of general discrimination (even if not directed towards the self) are also associated 
with particular values.  For example, if a sense of fairness motivates values then a belief in 
discrimination against some other group might lead one to support action to remedy that 
discrimination.  So we construct a variable, GENDISCRIM, from responses to questions about 
the general level of discrimination in British society18.  The responses to these questions are, 
unsurprisingly, correlated with the personal experiences but not perfectly.  This can be seen from 
Table 2 where whites report similar levels of general discrimination to non-white natives – 
perhaps interestingly it is the non-white immigrants who report the lowest levels of 
discrimination in British society. 
 
Economic Situation 
Because many values affect the rich and poor differently, self-interest would suggest the rich and 
the poor might have different values.  In addition, it is often argued that economic disadvantage 
(whether from discrimination or other causes) is a powerful source of disillusion.  We include a 
variable, INCOME, which is a composite measure of the economic situation of the respondent 
and the material deprivation of the neighbourhood in which they live.  Table 2 shows that, as 
expected, whites have higher levels of economic well-being than non-whites. 
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 It should be noted that GENDISCRIM is much less congruent than other composite measures we use in the 
analysis.  So, our findings of weak association between this variable and values may reflect the weakness of the 
measure rather than the weakness of the channel of association. 
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Pro-Sociality 
 We have discussed how ideas of reciprocity suggest that one’s values might be affected 
by the extent of pro-social behaviour directed towards oneself by others.  Accordingly we 
construct a variable, NEIGHPROSOC, to capture measures of pro-sociality in the neighbourhood 
using questions on vandalism, safety and neighbourhood cohesion.  Table 2 shows the lowest 
levels for non-white natives. 
 We might also be interested in how measures of individual pro-sociality correlate with 
values.  Accordingly we construct a measure, PROSOCIAL, derived from questions on 
volunteering, civic activity and charitable donations.  Table 2 shows similar levels of pro-
sociality for the two native sub-samples and a somewhat lower level for immigrants.   
 
3. Results 
We now turn to our analysis of the associations between the variables described above 
and the variables we treat as outcomes.  We reiterate once more that these are correlations not 
causal effects and will try to be careful in interpreting the associations we find.  One other 
general point of warning – it is tempting when looking over the results to be drawn to those 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero.  But statistical significance is influenced by 
sample size and, for a given sample size, (loosely) by the variance of the variable.  So more 
variables will tend to be significant in the white native sample than the non-white samples 
because the sample size is larger.  And the ‘Muslim’ dummy will tend to be more significant 
than the ‘Sikh’ dummy because the proportion of Muslims is higher than that of Sikhs.  So, one 
needs to look at the size of coefficients as well as their significance.  There are a large number of 
variables in a large number of regressions in what follows – we try to structure our discussion of 
the results in the following way.  We discuss which variables seem to have similar effects for our 
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three sub-samples and then which have different effects.  We then offer an interpretation in terms 
of the framework we set out previously. 
 
Toleration and Assimilation 
 Our first set of values relate to views on tolerance and mutual respect.  The variable 
TOLERANCE, asks the extent to which the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement 
“people should respect the culture and religious beliefs of others even when these oppose their 
own values” – responses are coded on a four-point scale with 0 being strongly disagree and 1 
strongly agree. Table 3 shows that there is generally a high level of support for this value but the 
level of support is higher among non-whites.  We also use a question, ASSIMILATION, on the 
extent to which the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement “different ethnic and 
religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society” – responses are coded on a four-
point scale with 0 being strongly disagree and 1 strongly agree19.  Table 3 shows that the level of 
support of this statement is higher among whites. 
 Regression results for these variables are reported in Table 4.  In the final row we also 
report an estimate of the dependent variable using a reference individual that is the same for all 
three sub-samples except for ethnicity which must differ for the whites and non-whites.  For the 
non-whites our reference person is an Indian though ethnicity effects turn out to often be rather 
small so our results are not very sensitive to that choice.   
 The first three columns of Table 4 show the results for the variable TOLERANCE.  As 
one can see from the final row, the mean level of this variable adjusted for characteristics varies 
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 In the CS half of the respondents are asked to report whether they agree or disagree with the ASSIMILATION 
statement (coded as VALS3 in CS) and the other half are asked to report the extent of agreement with the reverse 
statement i.e. “different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions” (coded as VALS4 
in CS). Because one would logically expect that disagreement with the latter is likely to imply agreement with the 
former, the ASSIMILATION variable combines VALS3 and VALS4 with the coding of VALS4 reversed. 
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very little across our 3 sub-samples.  The differences in the raw means reported in Table 3 is 
largely the result of the different ages – in all 3 sub-samples the old are less likely to believe that 
people should respect those from other cultures. 
 There are some other variables that have similar effects for all three sub-samples.  Those 
who feel treated with respect are significantly more likely to support mutual respect and 
toleration.  And those who believe it is possible to belong to Britain while maintaining a separate 
cultural and religious identity are more in favour of mutual respect.20.  More generally those who 
feel they belong to Britain are significantly more likely to believe in mutual respect and 
toleration.  Also, those who mix more tend to believe in mutual respect.  It is also worth noting 
that the other variables measuring local ethnic composition have coefficients that are not 
significantly different from zero. 
 Turning to the differences between our sub-samples, it is worth remarking that, among 
the white natives, those who feel discriminated against, those whose ethnic identity is important 
to them, the less well-educated, and the richer are significantly less likely to support mutual 
respect and toleration.  This constellation of factors is one we will see repeated for many of the 
values variables – the image it conjures up is of white natives who are not well-educated, who 
feel that their culture (that is important to them) is threatened by others and that one consequence 
of current policies is discrimination against and neglect of the white majority who have been 
become strangers in their own land.21.  For non-whites, those with a strong ethnic identity are 
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 There is obviously a close link between the dependent and independent variables here but they are not the same 
thing.  If, for example, immigrants thought belonging to Britain was unimportant then whether their cultural identity 
is compatible with being British might be expected to be unconnected to their views on mutual toleration and 
respect. 
21
 It is likely that these individuals are the pool from which far-right political parties in the UK and elsewhere draw 
their support – see for example the opinion poll conducted for the 2009 European elections at 
http://www.channel4.com/news/media/2009/06/day08/yougovpoll_080609.pdf   
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more likely to believe in mutual respect .  Muslims are more likely, and Sikhs less likely than 
those of other religions to favour mutual respect.  Ethnicity does not appear to be very important. 
 Using the conceptual framework laid out earlier we would offer the following 
interpretation of these results.  First, self-interest does seem to have some explanatory power.  It 
is likely that minorities - especially those whose ethnic identity is important to them – have more 
to gain from mutual respect from the fact that they are a minority.  On the other hand, members 
of the majority with a strong interest in their ethnic identity are less likely to be in favour of 
mutual respect as this does not ‘punish’ minority cultures.  One could also argue that the Muslim 
effect comes from the threats they perceive to their identity so that this encourages them to 
support policies of mutual respect22. 
 But, fairness and reciprocity also seem important.  Those who feel treated with respect 
are more likely to favour respecting others.  And whites who feel discriminated against (a form 
of unfair treatment) are significantly more likely to oppose mutual respect.  The fact that mixing 
is associated with greater mutual respect perhaps suggests that this fosters a wider ‘in-group’. 
 The last three columns of Table 4 show the results for the variable ASSIMILATION.  
The final row shows that the mean level of this variable adjusted for characteristics is not very 
different from the raw sample means reported in Table 3 – both non-white groups are less in 
favour of adapting and blending in than white natives and the second-generation are slightly less 
likely than the first-generation.  
 First, there are only a few variables that have similar and strong associations in all 3 sub-
samples.  The young, the less religious and those who believe it is possible to belong to Britain 
and maintaining a separate identity are less likely to think that minorities should blend in and 
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 This is essentially an interpretation based on Rawls’ ‘overlapping consensus’ – it says nothing about whether 
Islam is a particularly tolerant or intolerant religion, something on which many commentators have very strong 
views. 
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adapt.  Among white natives, one sees a similar pattern to that seen in the analysis of 
TOLERANCE – those with a strong ethnic identity, who feel they are discriminated against, the 
religious, those who do not mix with minorities the less educated and the rich are all more likely 
to think that minorities should adapt and blend in. 
 Among the non-whites, those who feel they belong to Britain, those who do not have a 
strong ethnic identity, who do not feel discriminated against, who speak English, and who live in 
pro-social neighbourhoods are more likely to think that minorities should adapt and blend in.  
Religion, ethnicity and the neighbourhood ethnic mix do not seem very important 
 Again, self-interest is a plausible interpretation of some of these patterns.  Minorities 
generally would be expected to be hurt more by being required to adapt to the larger society so 
are less in favour of it.  This is more so for those minorities who are more interested in 
maintaining their traditional culture, as evidenced by a strong ethnic identity.  But one also sees 
fairness again – white natives who feel they are getting a raw deal are less in favour of a policy 
that would benefit minorities. 
 
Equal Opportunities and Helping Others 
Our next variable, EQUALOPPS, is from a question on the extent to which the 
respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement “government should make sure that all groups 
have the same opportunities” - responses are coded on a four-point scale with 0 being strongly 
disagree and 1 strongly agree. Table 3 shows generally high levels of support with this principle 
but a higher level of support among non-whites.  Regressions with EQUALOPPS as depedent 
variable are reported in the first three columns of Table 5.  As one can see from the final row, the 
mean level of this variable adjusted for characteristics varies modestly across our 3 sub-samples 
– though the support for equal opportunities is highest among non-white immigrants. 
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 There are some variables which have similar effects in all three sub-samples – the young, 
those who feel they are treated with respect, those who believe it is possible to belong to Britain 
and maintain a separate cultural identity and those who exhibit pro-social behavior themselves 
are all factors associated with being more in favour of the government assuring equal 
opportunities.  For whites, the educated, the poor, those who feel they belong to Britain, those 
who mix, the less religious are all factors associated with being more likely to support equal 
opportunities.  For the non-white sub-samples those with a strong ethnic identity and those who 
feel discriminated against by public-sector organizations are more likely to be in favour of equal 
opportunities.  Again, many variables e.g. ethnicity, religion and the ethnic composition of the 
neighbourhood do not have strong associations with the belief in equal opportunities. 
The last three columns of Table 5 consider the variable HELPING, that measures the 
extent to which the respondent believes one should behave in a pro-social way – it is from a 
question on the extent to which the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement 
“individuals should take responsibility for helping other people in their local community” - 
responses are coded on a four-point scale with 0 being strongly disagree and 1 strongly agree. 
Whereas EQUALOPPS is about the rights individuals should possess, HELPING is more about 
responsibilities.  Table 3 shows generally high levels of support for this principle with only slight 
variation across the sub-samples.  The adjusted means in the bottom row of the last three 
columns of Table 5 show similar and high levels of support, it being slightly higher among the 
non-white sub-samples. 
Among the variables that are positively associated with this value is feeling respected, the 
sense of belonging to Britain, the belief that one belongs to Britain while having a separate 
cultural identity, the belief that one belongs to the neighbourhood, level of pro-sociality (a very 
strong association), being poor and, rather weakly, the old.  Turning to the differences there are 
 25 
strong ethnicity effects for the non-whites, with Indians, both foreign and UK-born being more 
likely to support helping others – though the differences from Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are 
only significant for the UK-born.  Those with a strong ethnic identity, and the more educated are 
more likely to believe in helping others.  Those who think there is a lot of general discrimination 
are less likely to believe in helping others.  For the whites those who do not mix and who feel 
discriminated against are less likely to believe in helping others. 
 Using the conceptual framework laid out earlier we would offer the following 
interpretation of these results.  First, self-interest does seem to have some explanatory power e.g. 
it is likely that minorities have more to gain from equal opportunity policies.  But, fairness and 
reciprocity also seem important.  Those who feel treated with respect are more likely to favour 
equal opportunity policies and those who feel they are discriminated against are more likely to 
believe in helping others. 
 
Free Speech 
Table 6 presents our results related to two variables that measure attitudes to the limits of free 
speech.  We use two measures related to freedom of speech in our data.  The first, 
FREESPEECH1, asks the extent to which the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement 
“people should be free to say what they believe even if it offends others” – responses are coded 
on a four-point scale with 0 being strongly disagree and 1 strongly agree.  Secondly we have a 
question, FREESPEECH2, on whether the respondent thinks there is too little, enough or too 
much free speech in Britain today with -1 being too little, 0 enough and 1 too much.  Table 3 
present sample means for these variables for our three sub-samples.  It can be seen that white 
natives are more likely to think offensive free speech is acceptable, while both non-white 
samples have similar views.  On whether the current extent of freedom of speech is too much or 
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too little, the raw averages reveal a dissatisfaction among the UK-born whites and non-whites 
about the freedom of speech as they tend to support that the freedom of speech in the UK is too 
little whereas the immigrants seem satisfied with the current extent of freedom of speech.  
The first 3 columns of Table 6 use FREESPEECH1 as a dependent variable and the last 
three FREESPEECH2.  First, consider the results relating to the variable FREESPEECH1.  
Considering the variables with common associations in all three sub-samples, the old, men, those 
without a religion, those in areas where they are a minority, the less-educated and the poor are all 
associated with a belief in offensive free speech.  Among the non-whites, Muslims (and, to a 
lesser but still significant extent, Hindus and Sikhs), are less in favour of offensive free speech as 
are those for whom religion is important.  For whites those who feel discriminated against, those 
who do not feel they belong to Britain but do belong to their neighbourhood are all associated 
with more support for offensive free speech.   
The last three columns of Table 6 report the results for FREESPEECH2, whether there is 
too little or too much free speech in contemporary Britain.  Here there are big differences in the 
adjusted sample means with whites thinking there is too little, non-white immigrants too much 
and the non-white UK-born in between.  The factors associated with the extent of free speech are 
similar to the previous three columns and in most of the times appear to have the same sign 
across the three sub-samples. In particular, the young, those who feel they belong to Britain, the 
less religious, the less educated, the poor as well as those who think they are discriminated 
against and who believe that neighbours are acting prosocially tend to think that there is too little 
free speech in Britain.  
To try to interpret these results, it is useful to have some awareness of the recent debates 
about the appropriate limits of free speech in the UK.  These have mostly been about the right to 
offend religions in general or Islam in particular.  The examples that spring to mind (and 
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probably do in the minds of respondents) are the Rushdie affair from 1989 and the Danish 
cartoons affair of 2005.  In terms of legislation, the most recent changes to the law have been the 
2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act, which made it an offence to stir up hatred against 
someone on the grounds of their religion (prior legislation having covered race) and the repealing 
of the archaic anti-blasphemy law that theoretically provided special protection to Christian 
sensibilities but in practice meant very little. 
 Given this background it is natural to think that the religious in general and Muslims in 
particular would seem as potential victims of an unrestricted right to free speech.  Hence a self-
interest model would predict the religious to be more against free speech – this is what we find in 
the data.  But we also find some support for the fairness model – whites who feel discriminated 
against and do not feel they belong are more likely to be in favour of offensive free speech. 
 
Summary 
 The regressions reported above include all regressors without interactions among them.  
We did, however, explore some specifications which allowed the associations to be different for 
different groups.  In particular, we divided the non-white samples into Muslims and non-
Muslims, and the white native sample into those living in areas with a high proportion of 
minorities and those in other areas.  Our general conclusion is that the differences between these 
sub-samples were not sufficiently significant to justify the extra length detailed description of 
these results would add to the paper.   
The questions we have considered do not cover the full range of values that have been 
argued to be important for society but do cover a reasonable range – the limits of free speech, the 
extent of mutual toleration, the extent to which immigrants should blend into the wider society 
and the extent and role of the individual and government in helping people overcome problems.  
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We would argue that self-interest does have some predictive power but is a long way from being 
the only important factor.  In particular, fairness and reciprocity, especially towards those with 
whom one shares a common identity seem important in understanding values.  In particular, the 
segment of the white population that feels unfairly treated and that they no longer feel part of 
Britain seem to have values that are hostile to minorities who they perceive as being treated 
especially well by contemporary Britain. 
 To make this point even more clearly, Table 7 presents results for two more variables 
which measure the extent to which minorities should become like the white majority.  The first is 
ALLENGLISH on whether you think that ‘everyone should speak English’ is one of the five 
most important values for living in Britain.  This variable is interesting because economic self-
interest probably means that low-skill white natives would be hurt if more immigrants could 
speak English as that would heighten competition they face in the labour market.  But imposing a 
burden on minorities might be what is supported if one wanted to hurt the group.  Table 3 and the 
adjusted means in the bottom row of Table 7 show similar levels of support between the whites 
and the immigrants but much less support of ALLENGLISH for the non-white UK-born with 
disagreement between the former two groups and the latter being more pronounced for the whole 
sample than for the reference individual.  But, among the white natives those with a strong sense 
of ethnic identity, who live in poor minority areas but don’t mix much, who are not educated, 
who feel treated worse and discriminated against, who do not feel they belong are much more 
likely than other whites to think everyone should speak English.  The same is true for 
PATRIOTISM , i.e. saying that ‘pride in country/patriotism’ is one of the five most important 
values for living in Britain.  It is this group of white natives that seems to be most readily 
identifiable in the data across all the values that we have investigated. 
 
 29 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the values that people hold.  Although it is a commonplace to 
argue that values are important, we do not have an entirely satisfactory way of thinking about 
what makes people hold the values that they do  - much of the writing on the topic is almost 
entirely normative.  In this paper we have argued that it makes sense to think of values as being 
about how one trades off one’s own utility against that of others (though expressed in an 
anonymous form) so is a measure of pro-sociality.  We then argue that the much wider literature 
about how people behave when faced with such trade-offs can be brought to bear on the subject 
of how people choose the values they do.  In particular, we have argued that self-interest, 
fairness and reciprocity and sense of identity are all likely to be important. 
 Our empirical application is to the UK, a society currently experiencing a certain level of 
angst about the values of its population in general and some groups in particular.  Our findings 
say something about that angst – on the whole we do not find evidence of very significant or 
irreconcilable differences between individuals of different ethnicities or religions.  Nor do we 
find any very large effects of the ethnic composition of the local neighbourhood per se (perhaps 
in contrast to the findings of Putnam, 2007, for the effect of diversity in the US on trust) though 
identity is often important and a companion paper (Georgiadis and Manning, 2009) finds 
significant links between diversity and identity.  But we do argue that the patterns we observe in 
the data can be interpreted as partly reflecting self-interest e.g. ethnic minorities are more in 
favour of mutual toleration and equal opportunities, but also partly reflecting fairness and 
reciprocity.  In particular, one result that stands out is that a section of the white population feel 
neglected and treated unfairly and that these groups have values that would be to the 
disadvantage of minority communities. 
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 We feel we should conclude with a health warning.  Our empirical investigations are 
nothing but a set of correlations in which the division between dependent and independent 
variables might often seem arbitrary.  But, we think this largely goes with the territory as it is 
very hard to find clearly exogenous variation in the variables of interest.  We do think that the 
importance of the subject matter in contemporary societies means that it is better to present 
something than nothing.  But we would hope this is the first word and not the final word on what 
has largely been a neglected topic – why do people hold the values they do? 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Demographics 
 
Variable  White British Non-white Immigrants Non-white British-born 
Age 47.65 41 30.3 
Female  0.52 0.47 0.51 
Married/cohabiting 0.65 0.64 0.38 
Education 3.03 3.13 3.56 
Ethnicity    
White 1 0 0 
Mixed  0 0.04 0.15 
Indian 0 0.26 0.24 
Pakistani 0 0.13 0.2 
Bangladeshi 0 0.068 0.047 
Black Caribbean 0 0.08 0.18 
Black African  0 0.17 0.06 
Chinese 0 0.04 0.03 
Other ethnicity 0 0.18 0.08 
Religion    
Christian 0.8 0.32 0.36 
Buddhist 0.002 0.03 0.006 
Hindu  0.0003 0.17 0.1 
Jewish 0.004 0.001 0.0005 
Muslim 0.001 0.34 0.31 
Sikh 0 0.05 0.08 
Other religion 0.02 0.02 0.03 
No religion 0.17 0.05 0.1 
Sample size (unweighted) 7842 3935 1596 
Unweighted proportion 0.58 0.29 0.12 
Weighted proportion 0.91 0.058 0.026 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables 
 
Variable  White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
IMPETH: Importance of ethnic background to your sense of who you are 0.63 0.8 0.8 
IMPFO: Importance of family’s origin to your sense of who you are  0.68 0.78 0.7 
IMPORTREL: Importance of religion 0.24 0.47 0.4 
ELANG: English Proficiency 1.99 1.44 1.9 
PETHWARD: Decile of the proportion of non-whites in the ward  5 9 8.8 
ETHAREA: Perception of  the proportion of people of the same ethnicity 
in the local area 0.32 0.81 0.78 
MIXING:  Mixing with people from different ethnic and religious groups  0.34 0.57 0.64 
GOVDISCRIM:  Discrimination by government organizations 1.96 2.07 2.16 
RESPECT: Extent individual feels is treated with respect 0.8 0.81 0.8 
GENDISCRIM: Discrimination in society 1.83 1.7 1.85 
INCOME: Economic situation 2.43 1.88 1.91 
NATIONID: Belonging to Britain 0.78 0.76 0.75 
DUALID: Belonging to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and 
religious identity 0.52 0.72 0.7 
NEIGHID: Belonging to local area 0.66 0.66 0.66 
NEIGHPROSOC: Neighbours prosociality 2.34 2.3 2.15 
PROSOCIAL: Own prosociality 0.11 0.08 0.1 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights. Higher values are associated 
with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions, see appendix A  for a detailed variable coding. IMPORTREL, ELANG, 
MIXING, GOVDISCRIM, RESPECT, GENDISCRIM, INCOME, NATIONID, NEIGHID, NEIGHPROSOC, AND 
PROSOCIAL are summated scales defined also in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.12). 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables 
 
Variable  White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Dependent variables     
TOLERANCE: People should respect the culture and religious beliefs of 
others even when these oppose their own values 0.72 0.8 0.8 
ASSIMILATION: Different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and 
blend into the larger society  0.54 0.49 0.48 
EQUALOPPS: Government should make sure that all groups have the 
same opportunities 0.8 0.9 0.89 
HELPING: Individuals should take responsibility for helping other people 
in their local community 0.76 0.81 0.77 
FREESPEECH1: People should be free to say what they believe even if it 
offends others 0.61 0.5 0.48 
FREESPEECH2: Whether thinks that there is too little, enough or too 
much freedom of speech in Britain today -0.26 0.06 -0.21 
ALLENGLISH: Everyone should speak English 0.36 0.32 0.21 
PATRIOTISM: Pride in country/patriotism 0.24 0.09                     0.10 
 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights. Higher values are associated 
with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions, see appendix A( table A.1) 
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Table 4:  Results for Mutual Respect and Assimilation 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
People should respect the culture and religious 
beliefs of others even when these oppose their 
own values 
Different ethnic and religious groups 
should adapt and blend into the larger 
society 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age -0.008*** -0.009** -0.009 0.011*** 0.006 0.0001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
Female 0.004 -0.019** -0.008 -0.023*** 0.003 -0.016 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) 
Mixed ethnicity  -0.006 -0.043  0.021 0.001 
  (0.023) (0.032)  (0.022) (0.032) 
Pakistani  -0.031 -0.021  -0.011 0.034 
  (0.018) (0.026)  (0.017) (0.027) 
Bangladeshi  -0.010 0.004  -0.031 0.029 
  (0.021) (0.033)  (0.023) (0.034) 
Black Caribbean  -0.037 -0.034  0.010 0.013 
  (0.022) (0.033)  (0.021) (0.033) 
Black African  -0.025 -0.102**  0.018 0.048 
  (0.018) (0.042)  (0.017) (0.039) 
Chinese  0.026 0.012  0.010 -0.022 
  (0.028) (0.048)  (0.027) (0.053) 
Other ethnicity  -0.024 0.010  0.012 0.023 
  (0.016) (0.036)  (0.015) (0.034) 
IMPETH -0.024** 0.047** 0.063** 0.025** -0.045** -0.048 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.029) (0.011) (0.019) (0.027) 
IMPFO  -0.003 0.015  0.011 -0.016 
  (0.019) (0.025)  (0.019) (0.024) 
non-Christian 0.014   -0.018   
 (0.019)   (0.018)   
Hindu  -0.020 -0.030  0.008 0.019 
  (0.017) (0.034)  (0.017) (0.033) 
Muslim  0.035** 0.021  -0.018 -0.018 
  (0.015) (0.029)  (0.014) (0.030) 
Sikh  -0.065** -0.061  0.006 0.012 
  (0.026) (0.035)  (0.022) (0.036) 
other religion  0.021 0.027  -0.009 0.015 
  (0.020) (0.033)  (0.020) (0.033) 
No religion 0.004 -0.026 -0.014 -0.009 0.020 -0.049 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.009) (0.021) (0.027) 
IMPORTREL 0.018 0.014 0.036 -0.033** -0.031 -0.034 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) 
ELANG  -0.010   0.032***  
  (0.008)   (0.007)  
PETHWARD 0.0001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) 
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ETHAREA 0.002 -0.001 0.009 -0.002 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
MIXING 0.095*** 0.012 0.104*** -0.035** 0.027 0.055 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.033) (0.015) (0.021) (0.037) 
GOVDISCRIM -0.045*** 0.003 0.028 0.086*** 0.023 -0.068** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.029) (0.014) (0.022) (0.031) 
RESPECT 0.078*** 0.075** 0.098** -0.034 0.005 -0.093 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.048) (0.025) (0.032) (0.049) 
GENDISCRIM -0.025** -0.013 -0.015 0.037*** -0.012 -0.016 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) 
Education 0.005*** -0.002 0.003 -0.006*** 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
INCOME -0.009** -0.006 -0.013 0.009** 0.006 0.023** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) 
NATIONID 0.064*** 0.078*** 0.089** -0.012 0.042 0.113*** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.035) (0.017) (0.023) (0.034) 
DUALID 0.161*** 0.070*** 0.133*** -0.134*** -0.071*** -0.049 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.026) (0.012) (0.017) (0.026) 
NEIGHID -0.016 -0.019 -0.037 0.022 0.008 -0.038 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.025) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.012 0.022** -0.018 0.001 -0.004 -0.034** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) 
PROSOCIAL 0.073 0.080 -0.019 -0.013 0.072 -0.099 
 (0.044) (0.066) (0.072) (0.042) (0.061) (0.079) 
Asked vals3 
question    0.443*** 0.569*** 0.537*** 
    (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) 
R-squared 0.090 0.048 0.091 0.543 0.646 0.604 
Obs 5361 2977 1413 5328 2902 1375 
 0.74  0.76  0.74 0.3 0.24 0.22 Fitted value for 
reference 
individual (0.013) (0.02) (0.03) 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. The dependent variable in specifications 
(4), (5) and (6) pools together responses to “different ethnic and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society” 
(coded as VASL3 in CS) with the “different ethnic and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions” (coded as 
VALS4  in CS) with higher values being associated with more agreement with VALS3 and more disagreement with VALS4, as 
half of the original sample was asked VALS3 and the other half VALS4  and this is why a dummy for whether asked VALS3 is 
also included in these specifications Regional dummies were also included in all specifications. Importrel, elang, mixing, 
govdiscrim, respect, gendiscrim, income, nationid, neighid, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A 
(see tables A.2-A.12). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent 
variables across the three subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to 
the sample mean value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”.  
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Table 5:  Results for Equal Opportunities and for Helping Others  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
Government should make sure that all groups 
have the same opportunities 
Individuals should take responsibility for 
helping other people in their local 
community 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age -0.003 -0.006** -0.019*** 0.004 0.006 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
Female 0.003 -0.012 0.010 -0.003 0.007 0.021 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) 
Mixed ethnicity  -0.039** 0.022  -0.045** -0.050 
  (0.019) (0.025)  (0.021) (0.029) 
Pakistani  -0.006 0.001  0.001 -0.068*** 
  (0.012) (0.019)  (0.016) (0.022) 
Bangladeshi  0.012 -0.002  -0.001 -0.099*** 
  (0.015) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.033) 
Black Caribbean  -0.022 -0.004  -0.042** -0.085*** 
  (0.016) (0.026)  (0.020) (0.030) 
Black African  -0.017 -0.004  -0.033** -0.051 
  (0.013) (0.030)  (0.016) (0.035) 
Chinese  -0.021 -0.061  -0.034 -0.039 
  (0.022) (0.047)  (0.029) (0.038) 
Other ethnicity  -0.031*** -0.005  -0.024 -0.084** 
  (0.012) (0.030)  (0.014) (0.033) 
IMPETH -0.001 0.032** 0.076*** 0.018 0.045** 0.027 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.022) (0.010) (0.018) (0.025) 
IMPFO  0.011 0.002  0.018 0.042 
  (0.014) (0.018)  (0.015) (0.021) 
non-Christian 0.013   0.030**   
 (0.017)   (0.015)   
Hindu  -0.002 -0.014  0.012 -0.030 
  (0.013) (0.028)  (0.016) (0.031) 
Muslim  -0.007 0.013  0.020 0.041 
  (0.010) (0.023)  (0.014) (0.027) 
Sikh  -0.048** 0.032  0.008 -0.022 
  (0.019) (0.027)  (0.019) (0.033) 
other religion  -0.007 -0.003  0.008 -0.002 
  (0.016) (0.025)  (0.020) (0.039) 
No religion 0.017** -0.010 -0.017 -0.011 0.015 0.0001 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.020) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) 
IMPORTREL -0.048*** -0.018 -0.004 0.027** -0.010 0.015 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.026) 
ELANG  0.002   0.014  
  (0.006)   (0.007)  
PETHWARD 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) 
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ETHAREA -0.0001 0.005 0.008 -0.008 -0.0001 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
MIXING 0.057*** -0.009 0.008 0.035** 0.033 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020) (0.032) 
GOVDISCRIM -0.016 0.037** 0.038 -0.031*** -0.011 0.031 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.012) (0.019) (0.026) 
RESPECT 0.033 0.061*** 0.087** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.084 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.034) (0.023) (0.029) (0.047) 
GENDISCRIM -0.005 -0.016** -0.009 -0.001 -0.020** -0.022 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) 
Education 0.003** 0.003 0.005 0.0001 0.004** 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
INCOME -0.023*** -0.009 -0.006 -0.014*** -0.023*** -0.0001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) 
NATIONID 0.059*** 0.013 0.007 0.033** 0.065*** 0.043 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021) (0.033) 
DUALID 0.115*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.037** 0.065*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.015) (0.025) 
NEIGHID 0.021 -0.010 0.011 0.075*** 0.028 0.054** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017) (0.025) 
NEIGHPROSOC -0.003 0.011 0.002 -0.007 0.011 -0.027** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) 
PROSOCIAL 0.092** 0.116*** 0.116** 0.294*** 0.203*** 0.267*** 
 (0.038) (0.042) (0.051) (0.035) (0.051) (0.070) 
R-squared 0.062 0.049 0.089 0.065 0.058 0.090 
Obs 5407 3009 1434 5388 2992 1411 
  0.81   0.9   0.83   0.75   0.82   0.8 Fitted value for 
reference 
individual (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, 
respect, gendiscrim, income, nationid, neighid, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables 
A.2-A.12). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across 
the three subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean 
value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”.  
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Table 6:  Results for Freedom of Speech 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
People should be free to say what they believe 
even if it offends others 
Is there too little, enough or too much 
freedom of speech in Britain today 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age 0.007** 0.002 0.018 0.020*** 0.019** 0.039** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.019) 
Female -0.056*** -0.024 -0.044** 0.007 -0.006 0.034 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.036) 
Mixed ethnicity  0.016 0.067  -0.017 -0.201** 
  (0.035) (0.043)  (0.065) (0.088) 
Pakistani  -0.011 0.013  0.005 -0.112 
  (0.027) (0.037)  (0.047) (0.077) 
Bangladeshi  -0.003 0.063  -0.041 -0.097 
  (0.034) (0.055)  (0.058) (0.107) 
Black Caribbean  -0.009 0.020  -0.142** -0.157 
  (0.031) (0.044)  (0.055) (0.087) 
Black African  -0.019 0.003  0.045 0.056 
  (0.027) (0.056)  (0.044) (0.109) 
Chinese  0.021 0.136**  0.093 -0.111 
  (0.040) (0.066)  (0.066) (0.141) 
Other ethnicity  -0.006 0.034  0.040 -0.156 
  (0.023) (0.046)  (0.039) (0.096) 
IMPETH 0.018 0.055 0.047 -0.038 -0.0001 -0.139 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.038) (0.030) (0.048) (0.075) 
IMPFO  0.041 -0.006  -0.028 -0.082 
  (0.027) (0.033)  (0.046) (0.068) 
non-Christian 0.028   -0.053   
 (0.023)   (0.055)   
Hindu  -0.048 -0.008  0.009 -0.061 
  (0.026) (0.049)  (0.042) (0.095) 
Muslim  -0.065*** -0.098**  -0.045 0.014 
  (0.021) (0.040)  (0.037) (0.086) 
Sikh  -0.112*** -0.010  0.0001 0.039 
  (0.035) (0.048)  (0.055) (0.099) 
other religion  -0.018 0.089  0.017 0.004 
  (0.031) (0.046)  (0.053) (0.098) 
No religion 0.035*** 0.048 0.058 -0.094*** -0.183*** -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.034) (0.035) (0.024) (0.059) (0.068) 
IMPORTREL -0.016 0.011 0.090** 0.058 0.028 0.108 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.039) (0.043) (0.050) (0.077) 
ELANG  -0.002   0.007  
  (0.012)   (0.019)  
PETHWARD -0.001 -0.0001 0.003 0.006 -0.015 0.013 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.015) 
ETHAREA -0.010 -0.021*** -0.008 -0.006 0.002 0.009 
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 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) 
MIXING -0.038 0.016 0.032 0.033 0.034 -0.041 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.048) (0.045) (0.056) (0.100) 
GOVDISCRIM 0.052*** -0.039 -0.123*** -0.073 -0.133** -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.039) (0.041) (0.060) (0.082) 
RESPECT 0.049 0.046 -0.036 -0.019 0.200** 0.348** 
 (0.033) (0.048) (0.068) (0.070) (0.085) (0.136) 
GENDISCRIM 0.020 0.009 -0.028 -0.023 -0.055** -0.048 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.048) 
Education -0.002 -0.008*** -0.018*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.017 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
INCOME -0.028*** -0.025** -0.014 0.044*** 0.020 0.056** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.028) 
NATIONID -0.079*** 0.054 0.020 0.236*** 0.172*** 0.203** 
 (0.021) (0.035) (0.048) (0.047) (0.058) (0.098) 
DUALID 0.008 0.026 0.025 0.015 -0.013 -0.036 
 (0.016) (0.025) (0.037) (0.034) (0.043) (0.071) 
NEIGHID 0.036** 0.006 -0.035 -0.022 -0.045 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.037) (0.039) (0.049) (0.077) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.0001 0.036*** 0.003 0.054** 0.010 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.039) 
PROSOCIAL -0.017 -0.096 0.009 -0.082 -0.016 -0.354 
 (0.052) (0.093) (0.105) (0.117) (0.169) (0.234) 
R-squared 0.030 0.033 0.077 0.034 0.046 0.073 
Obs 5341 2938 1403 5392 2963 1407 
 0.58  0.52  0.5 -0.2  0.12 -0.03 Fitted value for 
reference 
individual (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.1) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, 
respect, gendiscrim, income, nationid, neighid, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables 
A.2-A.12).  Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across 
the three subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean 
value for  categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”.  
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Table 7:  Results for Importance of English Language and Patriotism  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable  
Everyone should speak English Pride in country/patriotism 
Independent 
variables 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
Age 0.00298 0.00263 0.0281** 0.00826 0.00312 0.0277*** 
 (0.00529) (0.00736) (0.0118) (0.00459) (0.00428) (0.00801) 
Female -0.0679*** -0.000182 -0.0150 -0.0421*** -0.0106 -0.0244 
 (0.0136) (0.0177) (0.0226) (0.0122) (0.0105) (0.0158) 
Mixed ethnicity  0.0652 -0.0110  0.0115 -0.0275 
  (0.0512) (0.0560)  (0.0293) (0.0325) 
Pakistani  -0.0229 0.112**  0.0132 0.0275 
  (0.0381) (0.0616)  (0.0242) (0.0450) 
Bangladeshi  -0.00255 0.0502  -0.0342 -0.0383 
  (0.0470) (0.0864)  (0.0237) (0.0453) 
Black Caribbean  0.106** -0.00580  -0.00523 -0.0612 
  (0.0467) (0.0577)  (0.0236) (0.0287) 
Black African  0.0909** 0.108  -0.0163 -0.0393 
  (0.0383) (0.0838)  (0.0191) (0.0330) 
Chinese  0.101 -0.0296  -0.0287 -0.0729 
  (0.0659) (0.0882)  (0.0293) (0.0297) 
Other ethnicity  0.0865*** 0.0199  -0.00471 -0.0277 
  (0.0338) (0.0681)  (0.0175) (0.0338) 
IMPETH 0.114*** -0.0581 -0.0494 0.157*** -0.0110 0.00394 
 (0.0227) (0.0388) (0.0458) (0.0204) (0.0229) (0.0332) 
IMPFO  0.0406 0.0128  0.000680 0.0166 
  (0.0373) (0.0403)  (0.0221) (0.0309) 
non-Christian -0.00879   -0.0630   
 (0.0387)   (0.0311)   
Hindu  0.0703 -0.0342  0.0133 -0.0493 
  (0.0376) (0.0575)  (0.0210) (0.0278) 
Muslim  0.0125 -0.118**  -0.0206 -0.0955*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0466)  (0.0172) (0.0311) 
Sikh  0.0677 -0.0509  0.0355 -0.0572 
  (0.0512) (0.0578)  (0.0333) (0.0265) 
other religion  -0.0111 -0.0482  0.0295 -0.00281 
  (0.0418) (0.0557)  (0.0283) (0.0391) 
No religion -0.0244 -0.124*** -0.0497 -0.0760*** -0.0443 -0.0443 
 (0.0188) (0.0416) (0.0352) (0.0155) (0.0219) (0.0219) 
IMPORTREL -0.0247 -0.0333 -0.119** -0.0269 -0.0182 0.0195 
 (0.0330) (0.0394) (0.0488) (0.0289) (0.0229) (0.0328) 
ELANG  -0.0102   0.0331***  
  (0.0165)   (0.0103)  
PETHWARD 0.00722** -0.0117 0.00350 0.00167 -0.00472 0.00523 
 (0.00327) (0.00775) (0.00930) (0.00291) (0.00443) (0.00609) 
ETHAREA 0.00668 -0.00721 0.00994 -0.00767 0.000858 -0.00216 
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 (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0140) (0.00903) (0.00688) (0.00960) 
MIXING -0.193*** -0.00102 -0.00622 -0.0681** -0.0495 -0.0419 
 (0.0340) (0.0460) (0.0610) (0.0298) (0.0278) (0.0417) 
GOVDISCRIM 0.203*** -0.141*** -0.0219 0.194*** 0.00828 0.00338 
 (0.0306) (0.0423) (0.0487) (0.0269) (0.0251) (0.0367) 
RESPECT -0.0933 0.0444 -0.0295 -0.128*** -0.0420 0.0756 
 (0.0515) (0.0644) (0.0848) (0.0445) (0.0381) (0.0631) 
GENDISCRIM 0.0742*** 0.0329 0.0517 0.0391** -0.0258** 0.0202 
 (0.0186) (0.0218) (0.0299) (0.0168) (0.0128) (0.0205) 
Education -0.0140*** -0.0106** -0.00150 -0.00356 0.00302 0.00175 
 (0.00359) (0.00432) (0.00606) (0.00319) (0.00246) (0.00429) 
INCOME 0.0318*** 0.00829 -0.0112 0.0231*** 0.00160 -0.00214 
 (0.00975) (0.0144) (0.0171) (0.00847) (0.00803) (0.0121) 
NATIONID -0.0865*** 0.0828 0.0716 -0.0436 0.0540 0.0690 
 (0.0337) (0.0471) (0.0592) (0.0298) (0.0291) (0.0420) 
DUALID -0.219*** -0.106*** 0.0604 -0.0962*** 0.00535 -0.0453 
 (0.0242) (0.0321) (0.0437) (0.0215) (0.0207) (0.0274) 
NEIGHID 0.0101 0.0105 -0.0236 0.00526 -0.00260 0.000637 
 (0.0288) (0.0385) (0.0452) (0.0255) (0.0237) (0.0322) 
NEIGHPROSOC 0.0440*** -0.0411** -0.0346 0.00638 -0.0100 -0.00228 
 (0.0159) (0.0179) (0.0241) (0.0141) (0.0107) (0.0181) 
PROSOCIAL -0.0152 -0.0302 -0.271 0.00320 0.183*** 0.0522 
 (0.0897) (0.132) (0.140) (0.0789) (0.0727) (0.0944) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.065 0.026 0.054 0.055 0.041 0.054 
Obs 5441 3027 1434 5441 3027 1434 
 0.33  0.33  0.27  0.24  0.14  0.25 Fitted value for 
reference 
individual (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) 
 
Notes: Estimates presented are probit marginal effects, robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 
1%. Regional dummies were also included in all specifications. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscrim, 
income, nationid, neighid, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.12).  Fitted 
values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three 
subsamples  (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for  
categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”.  
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APPENDIX A:  Details of Construction of Composite Variables 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions  
 
Variables Scale Coding 
ALLENGLISH: Everyone should speak English Binary 1: yes, 0: no 
ASSIMILATION: Different ethnic and religious 
groups should adapt and blend into the larger 
society 
4-point 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree 
DUALID: Extent to which agrees that one can 
belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural 
and religious identity 
4-point 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree 
EDUCATION 4-point 6: degree or equivalent, 0: no 
qualification 
EQUALOPPS: Government should make sure 
that all groups have the same opportunities 
4-point 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree 
ETHAREA: Perception of  the proportion of 
people of the same ethnicity in the local area 
4-point 1: less than a half , 0: all the same 
FREESPEECH1: People should be free to say 
what they believe even if it offends others 
4-point 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree 
FREESPEECH2: Whether thinks that there is too 
little, enough or too much freedom of speech in 
Britain today 
3-point 1: too much, -1: too little 
HELPING: Individuals should take responsibility 
for helping other people in their local community 
4-point 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree 
IMPETH: Importance of ethnic background to 
your sense of who you are 
4-point 1: very important, 0: not important at 
all 
IMPFO: Importance of family’s origin to your 
sense of who you are  
4-point 1: very important, 0: not important at 
all 
PATRIOTISM: Pride in country/patriotism Binary 1: yes, 0: no 
PETHWARD: Proportion of non-whites in the 
ward 
10-point 10: highest density, 1: lowest density 
TOLERATION: People should respect the culture 
and religious beliefs of others even when these 
oppose their own values 
4-point 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree 
 
 
Summated Scales 
The following tables include detailed information about the construction of summated scales 
used as independent variables in our regressions. Each summated scale is computed as the 
average of the underlying single indicators (items) used to construct it. In particular, we reversed 
the coding of items where appropriate so that higher values of all items are associated with 
higher values of the scale (in this way the scale takes only positive values). Higher values of 
scales are associated with more or stronger support with the relevant statement (construct) the 
scale represents, e.g. higher values for the scale ELANG ( “English Proficiency”) imply better 
command of English, higher values of GENDISCR imply more discrimination in society, higher 
values of GOVDISCRIM are associated with more discrimination by government institutions 
and so forth.  
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Table A.2: Summated Scale for Proficiency in English, Items Information and Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
ELANG: 
English 
Proficiency 
ENGHOME: Whether English 
is the main language spoken at 
home  
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 
1 0.5 0.87 0.81 
 Reading: English Reading 
level  
5-point; 1: very 
good, 0: cannot read 
English 
1 0.9 1  
 SPEAKING: English speaking 
level 
4-point; 1: very 
good, 0: poor 1 0.87 1  
 WRITING: English writing 
level 
5-point; 1: very 
good, 0: cannot write 
English 
1 0.88 1  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights. 
 
 
Table A.3: Summated Scale for Discrimination in Society, Items Information and Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
GENDISCRIM: 
Discrimination 
in society 
RELINC: Religious prejudice 
in Britain today compared to 
five years ago 
3-point; 1: more, 0: 
less 0.8 0.71 0.8 0.51 
 RELPREJ: Extent of religious 
prejudice in Britain today  
4-point; 1: a lot, 0: 
none 
0.68 0.62 0.75  
 SRESPECT: Extent to which 
agrees that the local area is a 
place where residents respect 
ethnic differences between 
people  
4-point; 1: definitely 
disagree, 0: definitely 
agree 0.35 0.3 0.34  
 STOGETH: Extent to which 
agrees that local area is a place 
where people from different 
backgrounds get on well 
together 
4-point; 1: definitely 
disagree, 0: definitely 
agree 
 
 
0.35 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
0.35 
 
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weight 
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Table A.4: Summated Scale for Discrimination by Government Institutions  
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   
White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
GOVDISCRIM: 
Discrimination 
by government 
organizations 
How would you be treated 
from the following public 
organizations: 
    
0.86 
 RDIS01: A local doctor’s 
surgery 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
 RDIS02: A local hospital 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.5 0.51 0.51 
 
 RDIS03: The health 
service generally 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.5 0.51 0.53 
 
 RDIS04: A local school 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.49 0.51 0.53 
 
 RDIS05: The education 
system generally 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.49 0.52 0.56 
 
 RDIS06: A council 
housing department or 
housing association 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.61 0.55 0.57 
 
 RDIS07: A local council 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.54 0.52 0.55 
 
 RDIS08: A private 
landlord 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.35 0.54 0.56 
 
 RDIS09: The courts 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.49 0.54 0.61 
 
 RDIS10: The Crown 
Prosecution Service 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.48 0.54 0.61 
 
 RDIS11: The police 3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.48 0.54 0.61 
 
 RDIS12: Your local police 
specifically 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.42 0.58 0.68 
 
 RDIS13: The immigration 
authorities 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.45 0.56 0.63 
 
 RDIS14: The Prison 
Service 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.41 0.56 0.64 
 
 RDIS15: The Probation 
Service 
3-point; 1: worse than 
other races, 0: better than 
other races 
0.41 0.58 0.66 
 
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.5: Summated Scale for the Importance of Religion 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
IMPORTREL: 
Importance of 
religion 
IMPREL: Importance of 
religion to your sense of 
who you are  
4-point; 1: very 
important, 0: not 
important at all 
0.45 0.8 0.7 0.75 
 RELACT: Whether 
actively practicing religion 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 0.24 0.73 0.54  
 RELFRI: Extent to which 
agrees that religion affects 
who your friends are 
Binary; 1: strongly agree, 
0: strongly disagree 0.17 0.29 0.28  
 RELLIV: Extent to which 
agrees that religion affects 
where you live 
Binary; 1: strongly agree, 
0: strongly disagree 0.2 0.36 0.31  
 RELSCH: Extent to which 
agrees that religion affects 
what school you send you 
children to 
Binary; 1: strongly agree, 
0: strongly disagree 0.32 0.29 0.33  
 RELWRK: Extent to 
which agrees that religion 
affects where you work 
Binary; 1: strongly agree, 
0: strongly disagree 0.15 0.26 0.23  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
 
Table A.6: Summated Scale for Economic Situation 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
INCOME: 
Economic 
Situation 
INDEP: Index of 
deprivation in ward23 
10-point; 1: least 
deprived;  0: most 
deprived 
0.53 
 
     0.32 
 
0.33 
 
0.4 
 LOGY: Natural logarithm 
of equivalised household 
income 
Continuous; Measured in 
£000 
 
1.67 
 
1.31 
 
1.2  
 NOINCOM: Whether 
respondent has no income 
Binary; 1: no, 0: yes 0.97 0.92 0.92  
 OWNRENT: Type of 
accommodation 
3-point; 1: own occupier 
, 0: social housing 
 
0.8 
     
      0.62 
 
0.71  
 WORK: Whether 
household head is in work 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no  
0.65 
 
0.66 
 
0.69  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
 
                                                 
23
 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/ for details 
of how this is computed. 
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Table A.7: Summated Scale for Mixing with People from Different Cultural and Religious Groups 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
MIXING: 
Mixing with 
people from 
different ethnic 
and religious 
groups 
MXCLUB: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at a 
club/organisation 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never  
 
0.32 
 
 
0.45 
 
 
0.57 
   
 
0.87 
 MXFRIENDS: Proportion 
of friends of the same 
ethnic group 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.19 0.47 0.6 
 
 MXFVOL: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups in formal 
volunteering 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.44 0.6 0.62 
 
 MXHOME: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at 
respondent’s home 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.31 0.53 0.65 
 
 MXIVOL: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups in 
informal volunteering 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.22 0.53 0.55 
 
 MXNURS: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at child’s 
crèche/nursery 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.37 0.67 0.7 
 
 MXPUB: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at a 
pub/cafe 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.38 0.47 0.59 
 
 MXSHOP: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at shops 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.5 0.74 0.76 
 
 MXWORK: Frequency of 
social mixing with people 
from other ethnic / 
religious groups at work 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.63 0.82 0.9 
 
 MXWORSH: Frequency 
of social mixing with 
people from other ethnic / 
religious groups at a place 
of worship 
6-point; 1: daily, 0: never 0.17 0.49 0.4 
 
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.8: Summated Scale for Strength of Belonging to Britain 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
NATIONID: 
Belonging to 
Britain 
BELBRIT: Strength of 
feeling of belonging to 
Britain 
4-point; 1:very strongly, 
0: not at all strongly 
       
      0.76 
     
      0.75 
 
0.72 0.66 
 FEELBRIT: Extent to 
which agrees that feels a 
part of British Society 
4-point; 1: strongly 
agree, 0: strongly 
disagree 
 
0.81 
 
0.78 
 
0.78  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
 
Table A.9: Summated Scale for Belonging to Neighbourhood/Local Area 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
NEIGHID: 
Belonging to 
local area 
BELLOC: Strength of 
feeling of belonging to 
local area 
4-point; 1:very strongly, 
0: not at all strongly 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.77 
 BELNEIGH: Strength of 
feeling of belonging to 
immediate neighborhood 
4-point; 1:very strongly, 
0: not at all strongly 0.68 0.68 0.68  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.10: Summated Scale for Neighbours Prosociality 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White British Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
NEIGHPROSOC: 
Neighbours 
prosociality 
ABANDON: How much 
of a problem in the local 
area are abandoned cars   
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem  
     
     0.86 
 
0.81 
 
0.8 
 
0.83 
 DRUGS: How much of a 
problem in the local area 
are people using/dealing 
drugs 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
 
0.65 
 
0.62 
 
0.53 
 
 DRUNK: How much of a 
problem in the local area 
are people being drunk 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
 
0.66 
 
0.64 
 
0.59  
 NOISE: How much of a 
problem in the local area 
are noisy neighbours 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
0.81 0.76 0.72  
 RUBBISH: How much of 
a problem in the local area 
is rubbish lying around 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
0.6 0.6 0.53  
 SPULL: Extent to which 
agrees that people in this 
neighbourhood pull 
together to improve the 
neighbourhood 
1: definitely agree, 0: 
definitely disagree 
      
 
     0.59 
 
 
0.6 
 
 
0.53  
 SSAFE: How safe would 
you feel walking alone in 
this neighbourhood after 
dark 
1: very safe, 0: very 
unsafe 
 
0.67 
 
0.63 
 
0.64 
 
 TEEN: How much of a 
problem in the local area 
are teenagers hanging 
around 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 0.64 0.68 0.64  
 VANDAL: How much of 
a problem in the local area 
is vandalism/graffiti 
4-point; 1: not a 
problem at all,  0: very 
big problem 
0.86 0.81 0.8  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.11: Summated Scale for Own Prosociality 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
PROSOCIAL: 
Own prosociality 
CHGROUP: Whether give 
money to charity in the 
past 4 weeks 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no  
     0.77 
 
0.68 
 
0.74 
          0.82 
 CIVACT: Whether 
engaged in any civic 
activity in the last 12 
months 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 
0.09 0.07 0.12  
 EMPVOL: Whether 
involved in any employer 
volunteering scheme in the 
last 12 months 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 
0.55 0.57 0.62  
 EMPVOFT: Frequency of 
employer volunteering in 
the last 12 months 
3-point; 1: at least once 
a week, 0: less often 
than once a month 
 
0.23 
 
      0.28 
 
         0.2  
 FGROUP: Whether 
involved in formal 
volunteering during the 
last 12 months 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no  
0.43 
 
0.32 
 
0.45 
 
 FUNPD: Whether given 
any unpaid help during the  
last 12 months  
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no  
0.66 
 
0.62 
 
0.7  
 FUNOFT: Frequency of 
unpaid help in the last 12 
months 
3-point; 1: at least once 
a week, 0: less often 
than once a month 
0.5 0.44 0.46  
 INHELP: Whether 
involved in informal 
volunteering during the 
last 12 months 
Binary; 1: yes, 0: no 
0.64 0.54 0.68  
 INHELPOFT: Frequency 
of informal volunteering in 
the last 12 months 
3-point; 1: at least once 
a week, 0: less often 
than once a month 
0.39 0.38 0.39  
 
PTRUST: Trust in people 
in general 
3-point; 1: people can 
be trusted, 0: can’t be 
too careful 
 
0.43 
 
        0.32 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
 STRUST: How many of 
the people in the 
neighbourhood can be 
trusted 
4-point; 1: many, 0: 
none 
 
0.77 
 
     0.64 
 
        0.62 
 
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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Table A.12: Summated Scale for the Extent the Individual is Treated with Respect 
 
Summated scale Items used in scale 
construction  
Item Coding  Item Means Alpha 
   White 
British 
Non-white 
Immigrants 
Non-white 
British-born 
 
RESPECT: Extent 
individual feels is 
treated with 
respect 
REHEAL: Extent to which 
feels is treated with respect 
when using health services 
5-point; 1: all the time, 
0: never 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.73 
 REPUB:  Extent to which 
feels is treated with respect 
at public transport 
5-point; 1: all the time, 
0: never 0.73 0.77 0.73  
 RESHOP: Extent to which 
feels is treated with respect 
when shopping  
5-point; 1: all the time, 
0: never 0.77 0.81 0.79  
 REWORK: Extent  to 
which feels is treated with 
respect at work 
5-point; 1: all the time, 
0: never 0.84 0.83 0.84  
Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights 
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